William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2021

Trademarks in Conversation: Assessing Genericism After
Booking.com
Laura A. Heymann
William & Mary Law School, laheym@wm.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Repository Citation
Heymann, Laura A., "Trademarks in Conversation: Assessing Genericism After Booking.com" (2021).
Faculty Publications. 2071.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/2071

Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

6. Heymann ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

4/9/2022 11:09 AM

TRADEMARKS IN CONVERSATION:
ASSESSING GENERICISM AFTER BOOKING.COM
LAURA A. HEYMANN*
ABSTRACT
It is a fundamental principle of U.S. trademark law that to serve as
a trademark, a word or phrase must “indicate the source” of the goods
or services with which it is associated and, conversely, that a term that is
understood to be the common name of a good or service is “generic” and
cannot be protected as a trademark. Yet it still seems difficult to
determine exactly what each concept means, particularly when the actual
“source” of any goods or services might be opaque to consumers.
In part, this difficulty comes from the fact that status as a trademark
or as a generic term is necessarily contextual. The Supreme Court’s 2020
opinion in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com
B.V. emphasized the relevance of consumer understanding to this
inquiry. Words are not inherently generic or distinctive out of context;
APPLE is a trademark for computers but not for fruit.
Although individuals encounter trademarks in a variety of settings,
we ultimately care about this understanding in the context of a
consumer’s experience, since that is where relevant confusion is
operationalized. To use a supermarket analogy, the consumer is, at least
conceptually, first searching for the right aisle (“soft drinks” or “colas”)
and then searching among the shelves for the product they want (“Pepsi”
rather than “Coca-Cola”). The genericism inquiry is therefore about
assessing terms to determine whether they are related to an aisle search
or a shelf search.
Framing the inquiry in this way can help us to see that the question
is ultimately about consumer understanding of terms, not consumer use
of terms. Looking at how consumers talk about trademarks, whether
through corpus analysis, surveys, dictionaries, or other sources, can be
helpful, but it is equally important to consider how consumers understand
those communications. By thinking of trademarks as elements of
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conversations among consumers, and borrowing from Gricean
implicature, we might be able to determine whether a term is related to
finding the right aisle or related to finding the right product on the shelf.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 956
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INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental principle of U.S. trademark law that in order to
serve as a trademark, a word or phrase must “indicate the source” of the
goods or services with which it is associated and, conversely, that a term
that is understood to be the common name of a good or service is
“generic” and cannot be protected as a trademark.1 During the seventyfive years of the Lanham Act’s existence, courts and commentators have
put forward various phrasings to describe what it means to serve as a
trademark2 and various ways of describing genericism, and yet it still
seems difficult to determine exactly what each concept means,
particularly when the actual “source” of any goods or services might be
opaque to consumers.3
In part, this difficulty comes from the fact that status as a trademark
(and, conversely, status as a generic term) is necessarily contextual. The
Supreme Court’s 2020 opinion in United States Patent and Trademark
Office v. Booking.com B.V.4—which rejected a per se rule that would
Chancellor Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. Thanks to Mark Badger, Barton
Beebe, David Bernstein, Leah Chan Grinvald, Jessica Litman, Mark McKenna, Alex Roberts, Felix
Wu, and the editors and staff of the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, both for organizing
the symposium and for their careful and thoughtful edits to this contribution.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018) (definition of “trademark”); id. § 1064(3) (permitting petitions to cancel
a registration of a mark “[a]t any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the
goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered . . .”).
2 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Qualitex, to take just one example (albeit relating to color or
trade dress), talks about a trademark as something that “signal[s],” “indicates,” “identifies,” and
“distinguish[es]” source. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–66 (1995); see
also, e.g., Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2021
(2005) (describing trademarks as “designations of source”).
3 See, e.g., James Brooke, Factory Jobs Move Overseas as Japan’s Troubles Deepen, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/31/business/factory-jobs-move-overseas-asjapan-s-troubles-deepen.html [https://perma.cc/8CWX-XECF] (quoting the chief economist for
Merrill Lynch Japan, who referred to the “Nike model,” in which “you do the brand management
in Seattle and the manufacturing in Indonesia”); Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and
Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 388–89 (2011).
4 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020).
*
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deem generic all claimed trademarks that consist of a generic term for the
goods or services at issue plus a lexical unit equivalent to the top-level
domain “.com”—emphasized the relevance of consumer understanding
to this inquiry, relying on the “undisputed principle that consumer
perception demarcates a term’s meaning.”5 Thus, even though “booking”
is a generic term for the act of making travel reservations, and “.com”
indicates a business that operates on the Internet,6 the unchallenged
evidence in the case indicated that consumers do not understand
“Booking.com” to refer to online hotel-reservations services generally.
Rather, consumers recognize “Booking.com” as the name of a company;
hence, the term is not generic in that context.
The Court was correct when it reaffirmed that a trademark’s status
as such depends on consumer understanding, whether that understanding
is assumed (as in the case of a mark deemed inherently distinctive for a
particular good or service) or assessed (as in the case of a mark deemed
descriptive for a particular good or service, which requires evidence of
acquired meaning).7 Words are not inherently generic or distinctive out
of context; APPLE is a trademark for computers but not for fruit.
Consumer understanding is the touchstone because the goal, ostensibly,
is to facilitate the consumer experience in the marketplace. A consumer
looking for running shoes will have a variety of terms they would expect
to see during that search—“athletic shoes,” “running shoes,” or
“sneakers,” perhaps—and so producers of those shoes should be able to
use those terms to indicate that their products are in the same class of
goods as their competitors, if not necessarily of the same quality. By
contrast, consumers expect to see trademarks as distinguishing goods
among that class—Nike running shoes as opposed to New Balance
running shoes.
Thus, the concept of a trademark as a “source identifier,” although
now standard vocabulary in the trademark literature, may not be an
intuitive description to consumers of how trademarks function.
Consumers who prefer and search out Budweiser beer or Levi’s jeans
may not understand those trademarks to indicate or distinguish the
“source” of those products, to the extent that “source” means producer. If
asked, such consumers might say that the trademark names the product
Id. at 2304 n.3.
See Joanna Glasner, Dot’s in a Name No More, WIRED (Aug. 31, 2001, 2:00 AM), https://www.
wired.com/2001/08/dots-in-a-name-no-more/ [https://perma.cc/Y698-6SVS] (describing publicly
traded companies that dropped the “.com” in their corporate names in favor of “new names less
closely associated with the financially troubled new economy”).
7 Cf., e.g., Beebe, supra note 2, at 2021 (“Trademarks exist only to the extent that consumers
perceive them as designations of source.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2018) (permitting registration of
a merely descriptive term “which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce”).
5
6
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itself—in other words, that there is Budweiser beer and Michelob beer,
just as this person is named Jennifer and that one is named Amanda. 8 So
“source identifier” in this context incorporates a notion of the producer
as the source of the qualities or characteristics with which the good or
service is associated—Budweiser beer indicates “the beer made by the
producer that makes Budweiser with the set of qualities associated with
that producer’s beer.” The concept of the producer is necessary, lest we
fall into the trap of characterizing a trademark as generic because it
represents some set of qualities available to all producers.9
Although individuals encounter trademarks in a variety of settings,
we ultimately care about this understanding in the context of a
consumer’s experience, since that is where relevant confusion is
operationalized. In that environment, consumers are searching for two
things: the type of good they want and the particular brand of that good.10
To use a supermarket analogy, the consumer is, at least conceptually, first
searching for the right aisle (“soft drinks” or “colas”) and then searching
among the shelves for the product they want (“Pepsi” rather than “CocaCola”), even though the consumer might not separate out those searches
in their mind. The genericism inquiry is therefore about assessing terms
to determine whether they are related to an aisle search or a shelf search.
Competitors, for their part, need to be able to use the term that will allow

Cf. John F. Coverdale, Comment, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition
Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868, 875 (1984) (“Because most consumer goods are in this sense more
than mere fungible commodities, a trademark today does not evoke in the minds of consumers
separate and independent concepts of product and source, but rather evokes a ‘brand image.’”);
Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg & Steven M. Weinburg, A Proposal for Evaluating
Genericism After “Anti-Monopoly,” 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 102 (1983) (noting that “a
trademark can simultaneously identify both the goods and their source”); Barton Beebe, The
Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 653 (2004) (noting that the “primary
significance” standard of the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), “does little
to solve the problem at the root of the genericness inquiry” because “a trademark that is more
distinctive of its product than its producer, as most trademarks are, would appear still to risk being
found generic”).
I have offered elsewhere the analogy of a label on a file folder, in that trademarks serve to
collect various types of information about the trademarked good or service. Laura A. Heymann,
What Is the Meaning of a Trademark?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADEMARK LAW REFORM
250, 256 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2021). The issue is complicated to some
extent by the development of brand personas. See Laura A. Heymann, The Scope of Trademark
Law in the Age of the Brand Persona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61 (2012).
9 See, for example, the much-criticized opinion in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp.,
Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1982), which Congress responded to by enacting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(3).
10 Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1789, 1792 (2007) (“[W]e contend that the genericism doctrine should be reanchored to focus
on the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer in commercial contexts. By
refocusing the genericism question on consumer contexts rather than non-consumer contexts, the
doctrine may better reflect a term’s ability to perform more than one function in language,
depending on the user of the term and the context of the term’s use.”).
8
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them to be grouped with comparable goods in the aisle search and to use
trademarks as one method of winning the competition in the shelf search.
Framing the inquiry in this way can help us to see that the question
is ultimately about consumer understanding of terms, not consumer use
of terms. As many commentators have discussed,11 consumers use
trademarks in both source-identifying and non-source-identifying ways
in typical discourse—they talk of “googling” information on the Internet
or making a “xerox” of a document, even though, if asked, they will say
that they recognize GOOGLE and XEROX as trademarks. Looking at
how consumers talk about trademarks, whether through corpus analysis,
surveys, dictionaries, or other sources, can be helpful, but it is equally
important to consider how consumers understand those communications.
By thinking of trademarks not simply as instances of producers speaking
to consumers but also as elements of conversations among consumers,
we might be able to determine whether a term is about finding the right
aisle or about finding the right product on the shelf.
I. THE BOOKING.COM DECISION
The company Booking.com B.V. had filed four applications with
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to register the mark
BOOKING.COM for hotel reservation services and travel agency
services (some plus a design).12 Each application was ultimately refused
by the examining attorney on the grounds that BOOKING.COM was
generic for those services or, in the alternative, that the term was merely
descriptive of those services and so unregistrable.13 The Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the refusals, concluding that
consumers would see BOOKING.COM as referring simply to “an online
service for making bookings,” rather than a particular source of such a
service14 and that similar businesses that wanted to include
“booking.com” in their names and domain names (for example,
“hotelbooking.com”) would be “meaningfully hampered in their ability
to communicate the nature of their online booking services.”15

See discussion infra note 91.
From 1996 to June 2006, the company offered its service under the mark BOOKINGS, but it
changed its name to BOOKING.COM in June 2006. Declaration Under 37 C.F.R. § 2.20 of
Acquired Distinctiveness Under Section 2(f), ¶ 2 (Nov. 7, 2012), Joint App. at 16, U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020) (No. 19-46).
13 In re Booking.com B.V., No. 85485097, 2016 WL 1045674, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2016).
14 Id. at *11.
15 Id. at *13. The TTAB also affirmed the alternative ground for denial that the term was merely
descriptive without acquired distinctiveness. Id. at *18. The TTAB’s review of the refusals of the
other applications were issued in separate opinions but on the same grounds. See In re Booking.com
B.V., Nos. 79122365, 79122366, 2016 WL 1045672 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2016); In re Booking.com
B.V., No. 79114998, 2016 WL 1045671 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2016).
11
12
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Booking.com B.V. then filed suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which
serves as a means of appealing decisions from the TTAB but allows both
sides to introduce new evidence into the record. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the court held that “the relevant consuming public
primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus,
rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that
domain name.”16 As such, it went on to conclude that there was no
evidence in the record that “consumers or producers use the term
‘booking.com’ to describe the genera of services at issue, that is, hotel
and travel reservation services”; rather, “[w]hat evidence defendants have
produced shows that the types of services offered by plaintiff are
routinely referred to as ‘booking website(s),’ ‘booking site(s),’ etc.”17
The court also took note of a newly introduced Teflon survey18 on behalf
of the company, in which 74.8% of respondents identified
BOOKING.COM as a brand name.19
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a 2–1
decision.20 The court began by setting forth the framework for its
analysis:
To determine whether a term is generic, we follow a three-step test:
(1) identify the class of product or service to which use of the mark is
relevant; (2) identify the relevant consuming public; and (3) determine
whether the primary significance of the mark to the relevant public is
as an indication of the nature of the class of the product or services to
which the mark relates, which suggests that it is generic, or an
indication of the source or brand, which suggests that it is not
generic.21

Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d. 891, 918 (2017), amended by No. 1:16-cv-00425,
2017 WL 4853755 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., 915 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2019), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020), and judgment vacated,
141 S. Ct. 187 (2020). The Eastern District of Virginia went on to conclude that the company had
established secondary meaning as to hotel reservations services but not as to travel agency services.
Id. at 923.
17 Id. at 914. The case also involved a dispute over attorney’s fees, which is not relevant to this
Article.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 97–102 (discussing Teflon surveys).
19 Booking.com, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 915. The survey expert had also included
WASHINGMACHINE.COM in the list with the expectation that respondents would, by contrast,
identify it as a generic term; 33% of respondents nevertheless identified it as a brand name. Id. at
916. See infra text accompanying notes 103–114 (discussing the survey).
20 Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 915 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2019), aff’d, 140
S. Ct. 2298 (2020), and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 187 (2020). The USPTO conceded that if
BOOKING.COM were deemed descriptive, it would not challenge the lower court’s finding on
secondary meaning. Id. at 179. The company did not challenge the district court’s decision as to
travel agency services. Id. at 177 n.2.
21 Id. at 180.
16
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It then noted that “the consumer surveys in this record suggest that the
public primarily understands BOOKING.COM to indicate the company
rather than the service.”22 It found unpersuasive any concerns about
overenforcement, noting that, for example, a plaintiff still has to show a
likelihood of confusion in order to prevail in an infringement suit.23
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8–1 opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg, affirmed.24 (Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion,
and Justice Breyer dissented.) The Court began by noting the three
“guiding principles” that were “common ground” in the case: that a
generic term “names a ‘class’ of goods or services, rather than any
particular feature or exemplification of the class”; that a compound term
is analyzed as a whole; and that “the relevant meaning of a term is its
meaning to consumers.”25 It then concluded that because “Booking.com,”
taken as a whole, does not signify to consumers “the class of online hotelreservation services”—in other words, based on the evidence below,
which the USPTO left unchallenged on appeal, consumers do not refer to
Travelocity as a “Booking.com”—the term was not generic for those
services.26 To the extent there were concerns about the broad scope of
enforcement of such marks, the Court noted that doctrines such as
descriptive fair use served to limit those rights and preserve space for
others using the term in its descriptive sense.27
The USPTO had urged the Court to conclude that the particular
compound form at issue—a generic term for the relevant goods or
services plus “.com”—should not be recognized as a trademark
regardless of consumer perception of the compound term on the grounds
that such terms are generic as a matter of law pursuant to the Court’s 1888
decision in Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Co. v.
Id. at 183 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 186–87. Judge Wynn dissented from the majority opinion. See id. at 188 (Wynn, J.,
dissenting).
24 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020). I previously analyzed
the Court’s opinion at Laura A. Heymann, Response, United States Patent and Trademark Office
v. Booking.com B.V.: How Do We Know When Something Is a Name?, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON
THE DOCKET (July 2, 2020), https://www.gwlr.org/booking-com-b-v-how-do-we-know-whensomething-is-a-name [https://perma.cc/ECD7-PD9B]. Perhaps not surprisingly, my discussion here
mirrors that analysis.
25 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304; see also id. at 2304 n.3 (noting “the undisputed principle that
consumer perception demarcates a term’s meaning”); 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2018) (“The primary
significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be
the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or
services on or in connection with which it has been used.”).
26 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304–05.
27 Id. at 2307–08 (citing, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)). Justice Breyer, in dissent, found
competition concerns to be a compelling reason to deny protection to “[generic].com” marks. Id. at
2314–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an argument that descriptive terms should not receive
trademark protection, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003).
22
23
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Goodyear Rubber Co.28 Goodyear involved a dispute between the
Goodyear Rubber Company and Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove
Manufacturing Company, which had used various shortened versions of
its name to sell its product, including “Goodyear Rubber Company.”29 At
the time, as the Court noted, “Goodyear Rubber” was what we would call
today a generic term, indicating rubber produced according to the oncepatented process developed by Charles Goodyear.30 Hence, the Court
held that the plaintiff could not prevent the defendant from using the term
and gained no rights from the fact that its name was the “Goodyear
Rubber Company” since “[t]he addition of the word ‘Company’ only
indicates that parties have formed an association or partnership to deal in
such goods, either to produce or sell them.”31 The USPTO in
Booking.com thus argued that the name of a company that consisted of a
compound of a generic term for a product or service plus “.com” could
not be protected as a trademark because it, likewise, conveyed only that
the product or service indicated by the generic term was available
online.32 The Court, in rejecting this argument, noted that such an
“unyielding legal rule” was incompatible with the principle that “whether
a term is generic depends on its meaning to consumers.”33 Goodyear, the
Court noted, was simply an example of a compound term “yield[ing] no
additional meaning to consumers capable of distinguishing the goods or
services.”34
In the wake of the Court’s decision, the USPTO issued an
Examination Guide to provide updated guidance to examiners on
“generic.com” applications.35 That guidance conveyed, accurately, that
there could no longer be any per se rule rejecting “generic.com”
applications as generic but that each application must be reviewed on its

Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888).
Id. at 599–602.
Id. at 602. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company now holds several registered trademarks
consisting of or incorporating “Goodyear,” including GOODYEAR, Registration No. 4,494,937,
issued March 11, 2014, for tires.
31 Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 602.
32 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305–06.
33 Id. at 2306.
34 Id. (emphasis omitted). Justice Breyer disagreed with this characterization of Goodyear. See id.
at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Goodyear principle is sound as a matter of law and
logic . . . . [W]here a compound term consists simply of a generic term plus a corporate designation,
the whole is necessarily no greater than the sum of its parts.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 2312
(“Like the corporate designations at issue in Goodyear, a top-level domain such as ‘.com’ has no
capacity to identify and distinguish the source of goods or services. It is merely a necessary
component of any web address. When combined with the generic name of a class of goods or
services, ‘.com’ conveys only that the owner operates a website related to such items.”) (citation
omitted).
35 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., USPTO-T-9, EXAMINATION GUIDE 3-20, GENERIC.COM TERMS
AFTER USPTO V. BOOKING.COM (Oct. 2020).
28
29
30
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own evidence.36 Such evidence, the USPTO noted, could include trade
usage, consumer surveys, dictionaries, and usage by consumers and
competitors, “the same types of evidence examining attorneys
traditionally consider when assessing genericness.” 37 In particular, the
USPTO noted, “evidence of the ‘generic.com’ term used by third parties
as part of their domain names (e.g., ‘[adjective]generic.com’) in
connection with the same or similar goods and/or services” would be an
example of evidence that would support a genericness finding.38
The Court’s opinion, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, and Justice
Breyer’s dissent all highlighted the need for careful attention to survey
evidence in a genericism inquiry. The majority, citing an amicus brief by
several trademark scholars, noted that “[s]urveys can be helpful evidence
of consumer perception but require care in their design and
interpretation.”39 Justice Sotomayor, emphasizing this point, further
noted that “[f]laws in a specific survey design, or weaknesses inherent in
consumer surveys generally, may limit the probative value of surveys in
determining whether a particular mark is descriptive or generic in this
context.”40 Justice Breyer, for his part, found survey evidence to have
“limited probative value in this context” because survey results might
well yield association with a term that is evidence of something other than
trademark significance, which he believed to be true of the company’s
Teflon survey in the case.41
While Justice Breyer’s concern might be warranted in some cases,
the survey evidence submitted by the company in the Booking.com case,
which the USPTO did not challenge on appeal, indicated that the
respondents saw “Booking.com” as a trademark. This was likely the case
because the company did not simply offer services at the URL
www.booking.com42 but also used and advertised “Booking.com” as the
Id. at 2.
Id. For an example of TTAB review post-Booking.com, see In re GJ & AM, LLC, 2021
U.S.P.Q.2d 617 (T.T.A.B. 2021), in which the TTAB reversed the examiner’s refusal to register
COOKINPELLETS.COM on the grounds that it was generic for the identified goods but affirmed
the refusal to register the mark on the grounds that it was merely descriptive and had not acquired
secondary meaning.
38 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 35, at 3 (brackets in original). To be consistent with
the Court’s opinion, however, this guidance should be relevant only to the extent that consumers’
awareness of such domain names causes them to consider “[generic term].com” as generic for a
class of goods or services. The existence of the domain name www.hotelbooking.com, for example,
does not necessarily mean that consumers will not see “Booking.com” as the trademark of an online
travel-reservation company. See discussion infra note 42.
39 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307 n.6 (citing Brief for Trademark Scholars as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 18–20, Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298).
40 Id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor further suggested that a genericism
finding could have been appropriate based on the evidence, but that question was not before the
Court. Id.
41 Id. at 2313–14 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42 While correctly noting that consumer perception is key to the genericness inquiry, the Court did
36
37
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name of the company, which is also how media outlets referred to the
company in their reporting.43 Justice Breyer concluded that this name
“informs the consumer of the basic nature of its business and nothing
more,”44 but, in this respect, Booking.com is no different from the names
of other well-known services with registered trademarks, such as The
Weather Channel and The Container Store.45
More fundamentally, Justice Breyer’s dissent viewed competitive
need not simply as a justification for why generic terms are not protected
but as a means of determining whether a term is generic—suggesting, in
other words, that a term’s status can be determined apart from consumer
understanding. Thus, in critiquing the survey proffered by Booking.com,
he wrote, “If someone were to start a company called
‘Washingmachine.com,’ it could likely secure a similar level of consumer
identification by investing heavily in advertising. Would that somehow
transform the nature of the term itself? Surely not.”46 But it is not clear

get off track in one respect. In rejecting the USPTO’s argument that a “[generic].com” term could
never be distinctive of source, the Court wrote that such a term “might also convey to consumers a
source-identifying characteristic: an association with a particular website,” since “only one entity
can occupy a particular Internet domain name at a time.” Id. at 2306 (majority opinion). But that
confuses the nature of the registration at issue in the case. The company was seeking to register
“Booking.com” not as a URL, which is the province of the domain name registry system, but as a
trademark for its online travel reservation business, much like “Starbucks” serves as a trademark
for a chain of coffee shops, while its URL is www.starbucks.com. The fact that a URL necessarily
is associated with only one website does not make a trademark that is lexically equivalent to that
URL source-distinctive any more than the fact that 123 Main Street indicates a single address means
that the phrase “123 Main Street” necessarily serves as a trademark for any goods or services
offered there. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:17.50, Westlaw (5th ed., database updated Mar. 2021) (“[A] domain name does
not become a trademark or service mark unless it is also used to identify and distinguish the source
of goods or services.”). Although it would have been an extremely ill-advised business decision,
Booking.com B.V. could have offered its services under the trademark BOOKING.COM but at a
different URL altogether. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, also conflated the two. See Booking.com,
140 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The meaning conveyed by ‘Booking.com’ is no more
and no less than a website associated with its generic second-level domain, ‘booking.’”).
Relatedly, the fact that a company has “.com” in its name might mean that the term as a whole
is descriptive of the goods or services it offers—here, that the company called Booking.com offers
the ability to book travel reservations online. That conclusion, however, does not render the term
unregistrable; as the courts below found, it means that the applicant must present evidence of
acquired meaning in order to register the term.
43 See, e.g., Patrick Scott, Have App, Will Travel Like a Local. Hopefully, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/travel/have-app-will-travel-like-a-localhopefully.html [https://perma.cc/7CFE-UKXE] (quoting “Booking.com’s vice president of global
experiences”).
44 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45 THE WEATHER CHANNEL, Registration No. 1,696,588 (issued June 23, 1992, for
“meteorological services,” disclaiming only “weather”); THE CONTAINER STORE, Registration
No. 1,164,143 (issued Aug. 4, 1981, for “retail store services in the area of household accessories,
storage items, storage systems, and space organizers,” disclaiming only “store”). But see In re The
Consumer Protection Firm PLLC, Nos. 87445801, 87444846, 2021 WL 825503, at *11 (T.T.A.B.
Mar. 2, 2021) (finding that “The Consumer Protection Firm” refers to a category of “legal services
concerning the laws related to consumer protection” and so is generic).
46 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2314 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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why this would not, in fact, transform the nature of the term. Indeed, this
is precisely what Booking.com B.V. did—it started a company with a
name in the form of [generic].com, invested heavily in advertising the
name of that company, and transformed the term from something that
would otherwise have been perceived merely as the lexical equivalent of
a domain name to something that the majority of the consumers surveyed
recognized as the name of a particular company.47
Booking.com thus confirms that the inquiry as to whether a term is
generic is, and has long been, based on consumer perception in context.48
Evidence of that perception may be gleaned from a variety of sources, but
there is no Platonic ideal of genericness that can be assessed through
factors or qualities other than consumer understanding.49 The question
then becomes what the nature of this understanding is and how we
determine it.
II. WHAT DOES GENERICISM MEAN?
The siren song of the term “source” feels almost inescapable this
many years after the Lanham Act’s enactment. Saying that a trademark
must be distinctive or indicative of source is easy to do; determining what
source distinctiveness means is considerably more difficult. Although
Barton Beebe has thoughtfully clarified that “source distinctiveness”
should be distinguished from “differential distinctiveness” (the extent to
which a mark is different from other marks),50 the definition of “source
distinctiveness” understandably cannot help but include the term
“source”: if consumers recognize it “as a designation of the source of the
product to which it is affixed rather than as, say, a decoration on or
description of that product.”51 Asking whether consumers understand a
trademark to reflect “source” is a more challenging exercise this many
years removed from a system where trademarks and producers had more
of a one-to-one relationship.
Where a term is not distinctive of source, it might be because
consumers consider it to be the common name for the good or service
See id. (“The survey participants who identified ‘Booking.com’ as a brand likely did so because
they had heard of it, through advertising or otherwise.”).
48 Cf., e.g., Wolfe v. Goulard, 18 How. Pr. 64, 69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859) (“[N]o person can acquire
a right to the exclusive use of words, applied as the name of an article sold by them, if in their
ordinary acceptation they designate the same or a similar article.”).
49 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 12:11 (“The danger of the approach of those courts that have
discarded the ‘buyer understanding’ test is that it can lead to assuming that which is to be decided.
To state that one seller cannot ‘appropriate’ a term which is the ‘generic name’ of something as a
trademark for that thing is to assume that that term is in fact a ‘generic name’ of that thing. But in
many cases, the very dispute is whether that term is a generic name of that thing.”).
50 Beebe, supra note 2, at 2028–31.
51 Id. at 2028–29.
47
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(airlines) or because consumers initially consider it to be a description of
the qualities or characteristics of the good or service (“American
airlines,” as distinguished from “French airlines”). Consumer
understanding as to each can change over time, such that a term once
considered to be a trademark might come to be understood as the common
name for the good or service (such as “escalator”) in spite of advertising,52
while a term once considered to be a mere description of the good or
service might come to be understood as a trademark because of
advertising (such as AMERICAN AIRLINES).53
As Judge Hand asked in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., the “single
question” in such cases “is merely one of fact: What do the buyers
understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?”54 The
Lanham Act tells us that this answer depends on the “primary
significance” of the mark55 “to the relevant public,”56 and courts
attempting to conceptualize this understanding often resort to the
scientific language of genus and species—that the generic term is the
genus of which the trademarked good is the species. 57 Ultimately,
See Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 80 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1950). The
reverse—a term understood to be the common name for a good or service comes to be known as a
source indicator—happens very rarely. One often mentioned example is “Singer” for sewing
machines. The term “Singer” once referred to a machine produced according to the technique in
Singer’s expired patent but has now come to indicate the Singer company. See Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Redlich, 109 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
See generally Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” Trademarks, 17
YALE J.L. & TECH. 110 (2015) (describing the ways in which words change meaning over time).
53 See AMERICAN AIRLINES, Registration No. 4,939,082 (issued Apr. 19, 2016, for, inter alia,
air transport of passengers). A Notation to File, dated September 16, 2015, indicates that the
registration was issued pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
54 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
55 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public
rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has
become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”);
see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (“[T]o establish a trade name
in the term ‘shredded wheat’ the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning which
applies to it. It must show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming
public is not the product but the producer.”). Section 1064 pertains to the cancellation of
registrations but is now widely understood to also apply to the granting of registrations.
56 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); see also Bayer, 272 F. at 510 (determining that “Aspirin” was understood
as a trademark by manufacturing chemists, and retail druggists but as a generic term by the general
public). Of course, there can be more than one generic term for a good, such as “car,” “automobile,”
and “motor vehicle.”
57 Early cases include Singer, 163 U.S. at 179 (noting that the argument that “Singer” could not be
generic for sewing machines because many different types of machines existed “fail[s] to
distinguish between genus and species”); Buffalo Specialty Co. v. Van Cleef, 227 F. 391, 394 (7th
Cir. 1915) (in trademark dispute over the term “Neverleak” for a tire fluid, noting that “‘[t]ire fluid’
was the name of the genus, and ‘Neverleak’ was the name of appellant’s species” and so served as
a trademark); Bayer, 272 F. at 513 (“The validity of a trade-mark does not, indeed, rigidly depend
upon its meaning only the differential between a genus, defined by the kind of goods, and a species,
defined by that kind when emanating from the owner.”). On the usefulness of this terminology, see
Greenbaum et al. supra note 8, at 110 (“Imposition of this Linnean classification system does
nothing to advance analysis of the central question . . . . In fact, the genus-species test’s application
of irrelevant biological rubrics tends to substitute for analysis.”).
52
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however, consumers not trained in the law might say that whether a term
is generic or can serve as a trademark depends not on any conceptual
vocabulary but rather on whether the term is perceived as akin to a proper
name or as the common name for a good or service.
Many might have an intuitive sense of this distinction with respect
to personal names. We know, for example, that “Fido” is a proper name
and “dog” is a common name.58 In such circumstances, as D. Geoffrey
Hall has written with respect to children’s ability to distinguish between
the two, both semantic and syntactic cues help us to decide whether a
word is a proper noun or a common noun. As Hall writes,
The first of these cues is semantic: properties of certain kinds of
objects make them good candidates for receiving proper nouns. The
individuality of the members of many kinds of animate objects, like
people and pets, is important, but the individuality of members of
other kinds, such as pencils or socks, is not. A second cue is syntactic:
certain linguistic markers make some words better candidates for
being proper nouns. In English, proper nouns typically are not
preceded by determiners (e.g., we say “Garfield”), whereas count
nouns may be preceded by determiners (e.g., we say “a cat” or “the
pet”).59

Thus, while the same lexical unit might serve both as a common noun
and as a proper noun (for example, the concept of “faith” and the personal
name “Faith”), the cues that Hall describes typically allow us to
determine which one is meant in a particular context.
Trademarks complicate this framework, however, in multiple ways.
First, because trademarks are the names of products and services in a
commercial space rather than a personal space, goods that would not take
proper names in a nontrademark world take the equivalent of proper
names in a trademark world. We might not expect our socks to bear a
proper name as a semantic matter (in other words, unless we are
particularly fond of them, we do not typically call our socks Fluffy or
Fido), but our socks might very well bear the name Bombas or Nike in
the marketplace.60
Several studies have examined the ways in which children come to distinguish between proper
names and common names. See, e.g., Susan A. Gelman & Marjorie Taylor, How Two-Year-Old
Children Interpret Proper and Common Names for Unfamiliar Objects, 55 CHILD DEV. 1535, 1539
(1984) (reporting results of study in which the experimenters assigned nonsense names and words
to toys (“Zav” versus “a zav”) and asked children to categorize them); see also, e.g., Nancy Katz,
Erica Baker & John Macnamara, What’s in a Name?: A Study of How Children Learn Common
and Proper Names, 45 CHILD DEV. 469 (1974); D. Geoffrey Hall, Acquiring Proper Nouns for
Familiar and Unfamiliar Animate Objects: Two-Year-Olds’ Word-Learning Biases, 62 CHILD
DEV. 1142 (1991).
59 Hall, supra note 58, at 1142.
60 Hence, we see the other common way of describing a trademark as answering the question “Who
58
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Second, because of the way we talk about trademarked goods,
syntactic clues are also not as helpful. We might not typically use
determiners before a proper name (we say “Fido,” not “a Fido” or “the
Fido”), but it is not uncommon to use trademarks with determiners,
despite the canard that trademarks are adjectives that modify a common
noun. Thus, we might not often spell out, “I plan to buy a Ford
automobile” or “I’d like to order a Budweiser beer,” but we might well
say, “I plan to buy a Ford” or “I’d like to order a Budweiser.”
Third, and relatedly, because trademarks are indicative of the source
of a product and not the individual product purchased by a consumer,
trademarks used in this way appear to refer solely to the product itself but
in reality refer additionally to the producer of that product. In other words,
the assertion “I plan to buy a Ford” means “I plan to buy a car made by
the company that manufactures Fords with the set of qualities associated
with a Ford that are not associated with other brands of cars,” and the
assertion “I’d like to order a Budweiser” means “I’d like to order a beer
made by the producer that makes Budweiser with the set of qualities
associated with a Budweiser that are not associated with other brands of
beer.”61
Thus, when a trademark is used by a speaker to represent a class of
goods (such as “kleenex” for facial tissues generally), the question is
whether that usage will be understood as referencing a set of class
descriptions (a paper product used to blow one’s nose) or also a set of
distinctive qualities (the thickness or softness associated with the Kleenex
brand). When only the first becomes the understood usage, we can say
that the term has become generic; when the word, in some usages, still
references quality indicators, it has retained trademark significance in
such contexts.62 As Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson describe it, these are
“cases of category extension,” meaning “extending a word with a
relatively precise sense to a range of items that clearly fall outside its
linguistically-specified denotation but that share some contextually

are you?” rather than “What are you?” See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 3:9.
61 Ronald R. Butters & Jennifer Westerhaus, Linguistic Change in Words One Owns: How
Trademarks Become “Generic,” in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE II:
UNFOLDING CONVERSATIONS 111, 112 (Anne Curzan & Kimberly Emmons eds., 2004) (“A
trademark thus is really a kind of proper noun, but one that still refers to a class of things (e.g.,
Mercedes automobiles) rather than to a unique entity (e.g., Mercedes Norton, the first author’s
third-grade music teacher) or place (e.g., Mercedes, Texas).”).
62 My thinking here has been influenced by a discussion by Karen Sullivan and Eve Sweetser,
although I depart from the authors’ suggestion that the use of “kleenex” for tissues not made by
Kimberly-Clark is imputing “Kleenex-level Tissue Qualities” to the other product. Karen Sullivan
& Eve Sweetser, Is “Generic Is Specific” a Metaphor?, in MEANING, FORM, AND BODY 309, 317–
18 (Fey Parrill, Vera Tobin & Mark Turner eds., 2010).
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relevant properties with items inside the denotation.”63 The goal is to
determine when the specified denotation no longer pertains.
In some ways, genericism can be considered akin to the doctrine of
functionality for product features. Both concepts embody the idea that
competitors need access to certain aspects associated with a good in order
to compete effectively in the market—either a term that represents the
common name for the product or service one is selling or a product
feature that is desired by consumers for non-source-identifying reasons
(assuming that feature is not protected by a patent). But there is only so
much that can be gained by referring to genericism as the equivalent of
functionality. De jure functionality, as a matter of trademark law, is a
doctrine that denies trademark protection for a feature despite the
feature’s serving as a source indicator; it is a doctrine justified by the
policy that a competitor is free to copy a functional product feature if it
is not protected by a patent.
Under that doctrine, an entity cannot assert trademark rights in a
product feature that is deemed to be functional even if the entity can show
that the feature is distinctive of source. To take the example from TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the Supreme Court’s signal
case on utilitarian functionality, the dual-spring sign stand design at issue
in the case could not be claimed as protectable trade dress despite the fact
that years of patent exclusivity had arguably led consumers to understand
the design as indicating Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) as the source of
the stands.64 Since the patent had expired, TrafFix was entitled as a matter
of patent law to copy the design and compete in the market for such sign
stands, and the Court held that this interest outweighed any interests in
prohibiting use of the feature as a matter of trademark law.65 In other
words, the Court did not hold that the dual-spring design was not
distinctive of source; it held that MDI had no trademark rights in the
design despite the possibility of its being distinctive of source.66 By
contrast, a finding that a term is generic is not a conclusion that a term
should be available to competitors despite its serving as a source
indicator; a finding that a term is generic is a determination that a term
does not serve as a source indicator. Thus, while a generic term could be
said to be de facto functional, in that the use of a generic term serves the
important function of allowing efficient conversation about goods and
Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, A Deflationary Account of Metaphors, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 84, 91 (Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. ed., 2008).
64 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
65 Id. at 29 (discussing the “well-established rule that trade dress protection may not be claimed for
product features that are functional”).
66 Id. at 35 (“MDI cannot gain the exclusive right to produce sign stands using the dual-spring
design by asserting that consumers associate it with the look of the invention itself.”).
63
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services, little is gained by introducing a concept of de jure functionality
into the mix.
Likewise, if, as Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent in
Booking.com, we should exclude certain terms from protection despite
their serving as a source identifier because we are concerned about the
scope of trademark rights67—that an entity that can secure rights in
“booking.com” will seek to extend those rights to enjoin the use of
“hotelbooking.com” and so forth—we should be clear that the principle
motivating that argument is not that the term at issue is generic. Rather,
the principle is that there is a competing policy that should deny
trademark protection to the term despite its serving as a source indicator,
just as TrafFix denied protection to the dual-spring design in question
regardless of any evidence that consumers perceived the trade dress of
the feature as a source indicator. And, similar to TrafFix, because such a
principle would operate outside of the genericism inquiry, it would need
not only its own doctrinal name but also a test to determine when such
limitations should apply.68
Alternatively, courts could, in particular cases, determine remedies
that would achieve limitations on scope without altering the genericism
inquiry. One example comes from Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing
Co., in which the court enacted something akin to defense-side
genericism by holding that the phrase “Honey Brown” was generic as
applied to defendant’s ales while leaving open the possibility that the
phrase could continue to serve as a trademark for plaintiff’s lager.69 The
nominative/descriptive fair use hybrid that characterizes the space given
to comparative advertising (“compare to”) or private label or store brand
trade dress70 might be another source of inspiration.

See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197
(2016).
68 See, e.g., Vincent N. Palladino, Genericism Rationalized: Another View, 90 TRADEMARK REP.
469 (2000) (proposing a multifactor test for genericism based on competitive need).
69 Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997). In my view, the court
in Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent created a form of defense-side aesthetic functionality by
amending Louboutin’s registration for a red outsole so that it covered only a red outsole contrasting
with the remainder of the shoe. Christian Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc.,
696 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Although . . . we determine that the Mark as it currently stands
is ineligible for protection insofar as it would preclude competitors’ use of red outsoles in all
situations, including the monochromatic use now before us, we conclude that the Mark has acquired
secondary meaning—and thus the requisite ‘distinctness’ to merit protection—when used as a red
outsole contrasting with the remainder of the shoe.”) (emphasis added).
70 Cf. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The nominative fair use
analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff’s
product, even if the defendant’s ultimate goal is to describe his own product. Conversely, the classic
fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark only to describe his
own product, and not at all to describe the plaintiff’s product.”) (footnote and emphases omitted).
67
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The focus on consumer understanding might also seem to some to
run up against what is perceived as a doctrinal rule that a generic term
can never gain trademark status, no matter the efforts of an entity to make
it so. This rule was articulated perhaps most famously in Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,71 the source of the ubiquitous “spectrum
of distinctiveness.” In describing the nature of generic terms, the Second
Circuit noted that because the Lanham Act provides for cancellation of
registered marks if they have become generic,
even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some “merely
descriptive” marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term
into a subject for trademark . . . . [N]o matter how much money and
effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of
its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public
identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the
product of the right to call an article by its name.72

But the cases the court cites for this proposition are examples of what has
been called “de facto secondary meaning”—an association between a
manufacturer and a term that results from exclusivity or market share but
that is not an association reflecting source distinctiveness. 73 For example,
if a product is new and so is available only from one company, consumers
might associate the common name of the product with that company. If a
group of consumers were asked with which company they associated the
term “self-driving car,” many of them might (at the time of this writing)
say “Tesla.” But that is not “secondary” meaning, since “self-driving car”
continues to be the common name of the product for such consumers;
rather, it is simply a reflection—bound up with the vague term
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 9. At the time, section 14 of the Lanham Act provided for cancellation of a registration if
the mark had become “the common descriptive name of an article or substance.” Id. The statutory
language now provides for cancellation if, inter alia, the mark “becomes the generic name for the
goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2018).
73 See, e.g., J. Kohnstam Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (affirming
refusal to register “matchbox” for toy vehicles when term for packaging was in the dictionary and
had been in use for toys prior to applicant’s use of it; even if applicant was the sole user of the term
for toys for a period thereafter, and so “the public might [have] come to associate that source with
the name by which the merchandise is called,” the term remained generic “no matter how much
money or effort [the producer] pours into promoting the sale of the merchandise”); In re Preformed
Line Prods. Co., 323 F.2d 1007, 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (affirming refusal to register “Preformed”
for accessories for electrical cables and similar goods given applicant’s own descriptive use of the
term; the fact that competitors used different terms to describe products shaped in advance of use
and evidence of applicant’s advertising and sale volume did not change the nature of the term);
Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Caracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 847–48 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(discussing cases “in which various marks had in fact come to indicate origin or had acquired what
we may call ‘de facto secondary meanings,’ due to temporary use by no one other than the applicant,
for example, yet which cannot be registered” and noting that although companies that invest in
advertising might “succeed in the creation of de facto secondary meaning, due to lack of
competition or other happenstance, the law respecting registration will not give it any effect”).
71
72
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“association”74—of the market share (and so top-of-mind status) Tesla
currently holds. The concept can be further confused by surveys that
present a product term to respondents and ask whether “one company
makes this or more than one company makes this,” since in cases in which
one manufacturer holds a strong market share, the answer might be
“one.”75
The first use of the term “de facto secondary meaning” in a reported
case appears to be in In re Deister Concentrator Co., in which the court
concluded that the USPTO appropriately refused registration for a
rhomboidal shape for ore concentrating and coal cleaning tables.76 Noting
that the evidence in the case led to the conclusion that the shape was
functional and thus subject to copying, and referencing the Supreme
Court’s 1938 opinion in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. (the
“shredded wheat” case),77 the Deister court noted a distinction between
what it called “a de facto ‘secondary meaning’ and one to which courts
will attach legal consequences.”78 This distinction, the court wrote, meant
that
as to some words and shapes the courts will never apply the
“secondary meaning” doctrine so as to create monopoly rights. The
true basis of such holdings is not that they cannot or do not indicate
The lack of specificity around what kind of association is legally relevant can also prove
problematic in dilution cases. In Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., for example, the court determined
that because the six statutory factors that a court “may consider” to determine “whether a mark or
trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring” favored Nike, including whether there is “[a]ny
actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark,” there was a likelihood
that Nike would suffer dilution if Nikepal were allowed to continue use of its name. Nike, Inc. v.
Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-01468, 2007 WL 2782030, at *6, *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2018). The court did not, however, make a determination, based
on these factors, that dilution was indeed likely to occur. See also Barton Beebe, Roy Germano,
Christopher Jon Sprigman & Joel H. Steckel, Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and the Lab,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 617 (2019) (presenting experimental evidence that “even when consumers
associate a junior mark with a famous senior mark, this association does not necessarily result in
any impairment of the ability of the senior mark to identify and distinguish its source and other
associations”).
75 Cf., e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 528 (E.D.N.Y.
1975) (concluding that plaintiff’s survey asking about a product “made by one company” showed
evidence that the term “Teflon” was a brand name).
76 In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
77 In Kellogg, the Court rejected the National Biscuit Co.’s claim to trademark rights over the term
“shredded wheat,” given that the term was the generic name of the product, and noted that what
National Biscuit Co. claimed to be secondary meaning was actually only evidence
that due to the long period in which the plaintiff or its predecessor was the only
manufacturer of the product, many people have come to associate the product, and as a
consequence the name by which the product is generally known, with the plaintiff’s
factory at Niagara Falls. But to establish a trade name in the term “shredded wheat” the
plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. It must show
that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the
product but the producer. This it has not done.
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
78 Deister, 289 F.2d at 503.
74
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source to the purchasing public but that there is an overriding public
policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving the public
right to copy.79

Thus, the court used the term “de facto secondary meaning” not as the
basis for holding a product feature unprotectable under trademark law but
to describe existing source association for a product feature already
deemed unprotectable under trademark law.
As applied to product features, the court’s holding—derived in part
from Kellogg and echoed in the Court’s later opinion in TrafFix—reflects
competition policy. It is unclear from the opinion the precise nature of
the evidence regarding consumer perception as to the table shape—in
other words, whether it was an association emanating from market share
or an association suggesting source distinctiveness. Regardless, the
doctrine that says that functional features should be available to
competitors to copy despite evidence of source distinctiveness reflects,
as the Deister court notes, “an overriding public policy . . . of preserving
the public right to copy.”80
But it is more difficult to see how this works for word marks, despite
the Deister court’s reference to them.81 An “overriding public policy” of
preserving the public’s right to use certain words as common names for
goods or services despite public understanding of those words as source
indicating has to be rooted in the conclusion that those words are not, in
fact, source indicating.82 The Abercrombie court acknowledged this, in
my opinion, when it referred to
a series of well known cases holding that when a suggestive or fanciful
term has become generic as a result of a manufacturer’s own
advertising efforts, trademark protection will be denied save for those
markets where the term still has not become generic and a secondary
meaning has been shown to continue.83

Id. at 504.
Id.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 12:47 (noting that “[i]n the context of the ‘functionality’ issue,
rejecting proof of trademark status as ‘de facto secondary meaning’ has some semantic meaning”
but that courts that have taken the phrase from such cases and used it for genericism disputes have
“misapplied it”).
82 Id. § 12:46 (“In the context of generic names disputes, so-called ‘de facto secondary meaning’
is a misnomer. . . . [E]vidence of secondary meaning (such as a survey) is evidence of trademark
significance and is evidence negating a genericness challenge.”); see also Vincent N. Palladino,
Assessing Trademark Significance: Genericness, Secondary Meaning and Surveys, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 857, 857 (2002) (“The notion that secondary meaning and genericness are
opposite sides of the same coin follows logically from the nature of trademarks.”).
83 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (2d Cir. 1921); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.,
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963)).
79
80
81
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Thus, the suggestion that genericism is the equivalent of functionality,
the “rule” of “once generic, always generic,” and the concept of “de facto
secondary meaning” all seem to be rooted in the idea of genericism as a
state of nature, existing separate from considerations of how language is
used and understood. But there are no lexical or other characteristics that
tell us why “car” is generic for a particular kind of motor vehicle apart
from the fact that speakers of English understand it in precisely this way,
at this moment in time,84 just as speakers of French understand “voiture”
in the same way. It is only in the disputed cases, of course, that we need
to resort to sources beyond our own intuition to make this determination.
III. HOW SHOULD CONSUMER PERCEPTION BE DETERMINED?
If categorizing a term as generic or as a trademark depends on
consumer understanding, where should we look for evidence of
understanding and how should we assess it? As the Court noted in
Booking.com, “Evidence informing that inquiry can include not only
consumer surveys, but also dictionaries, usage by consumers and
competitors, and any other source of evidence bearing on how consumers
perceive a term’s meaning.”85 This does not mean, of course, that we need
the same amount of evidence in every case to conclude that a term is
generic. If an automobile manufacturer attempted to claim trademark
rights in the word “car,” administrative efficiency would counsel that
very little beyond the court’s own understanding, as reflecting common
knowledge, would be needed (with, perhaps, a citation to the dictionary
for good measure), even though each of us might have a different picture
in our minds when asked to imagine what a “car” looks like.

Cf. Linford, supra note 52 (describing the ways in which words change meaning over time).
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 n.6 (2020). But see
Desai & Rierson, supra note 10, at 1833 (rejecting evidence such as dictionary definitions and
media uses as not indicative of “what should be the core question in any genericism determination:
whether the mark is functioning as a source-identifier in the relevant commercial context”).
Consumer perception can, of course, be influenced by design elements and placement, among
other choices. Possidonia F.D. Gontijo, Janice Rayman, Shi Zhang & Eran Zaidel, How Brand
Names Are Special: Brands, Words, and Hemispheres, 82 BRAIN & LANGUAGE 327, 335 (2002)
(“[W]e suggest [based on an experiment] that the visual representation of proper names, brand
names and also that of abbreviations is an intrinsic part of their identities. The visual features are
clues to the lexical category to which a word belongs.”); Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen &
Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY
L.J. 575, 575 (2008); David Luna, Marina Carnevale & Dawn Lerman, Does Brand Spelling
Influence Memory? The Case of Auditorily Presented Brand Names, J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 36, 37–
38 (2013) (“Through the lexical (or direct) route, a top-down process occurs as individuals access
the spelling of a word by retrieving its lexical representation from long term memory. That is,
individuals access the spelling of the target word by referring to a representation in memory of that
word or another word that contains the same pronunciation pattern.”).
84
85
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In more difficult cases, the ability to collect and search information
online provides a rich resource of evidence as to consumer understanding.
Corpora have become increasingly discussed as a source of consumer
perception, in part because corpora exist free from the bias of litigation—
they are uses in the wild, as it were.86 Social media provides another
corpora-like source of consumer perception, as Alexandra Roberts has
thoughtfully examined in this issue,87 so long as we keep in mind that the
use of certain sites—and, indeed, access to the Internet itself—will be
mediated by characteristics such as educational level and socioeconomic
class.88 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette has advocated for using Google search
results to determine whether “most users searching for a term are looking
for a particular source or whether they are looking for a product in
general,” given that Google’s algorithms are designed to provide results
responsive to what users are looking for.89
It is also important to interpret this evidence in a way that helps to
answer the question at hand. The lack of capitalization, particularly on
social media, is not necessarily evidence of consumer understanding of a
term as generic, nor is the absence of a paired generic term or use of a
mark as a noun (such as when one orders “a coke”). Conversely, given
that Microsoft Word autocorrects certain lowercase words to capitalize
them (such as, at this writing, Kleenex and Velcro) and Google does not,
at this writing, enable case-sensitive search (such that searches for
“kleenex” will return results for “Kleenex”),90 observed uses of
capitalization might not be evidence of consumer recognition of the term
as a trademark. Similarly, consumers can use marks in ways that resemble
generic uses or as a verb while still recognizing the term as a trademark
(such as when an individual asks someone to “xerox” a document or
“google” information).91 In short, as Neal Hoopes has noted,
See Quentin J. Ullrich, Corpora in the Courts: Using Textual Data to Gauge Genericness and
Trademark Validity, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 989 (2018).
87 Alexandra J. Roberts, Mark Talk, 39 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1001 (2021).
88 For example, according to information provided by Yelp, as of June 2021, 76% of U.S. Yelp
users have attended at least some college, and 79% of U.S. Yelp users have an annual income of
$60,000 or above. Fast Facts, YELP, https://www.yelp-press.com/company/fast-facts/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C6TH-ZEVA] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
89 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 351, 398,
401 (noting that “Google generally provides sites [in its search results] related to what users search
for (which it has profit-based incentives to do)” and that “it evaluates algorithm changes based on
whether the change increases the frequency with which users click on the top search results”).
90 See How to Search on Google, GOOGLE SEARCH HELP, https://support.google.com/websearch
/answer/134479 [https://perma.cc/T5MP-TDP9] (last visited Apr. 23, 2021) (“A search for New
York Times is the same as a search for new york times.”).
91 See, e.g., Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (declining to find GOOGLE
generic even though some members of the public used “google” as a verb); Itamar Simonson, An
Empirical Investigation of the Meaning and Measurement of “Genericness,” 84 TRADEMARK REP.
199, 214 (1994) (suggesting that “genericness measures should identify (1) the share of buyers for
whom the disputed name has just one meaning as a generic term or a trademark, (2) the share of
86
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“[L]inguistic data alone—including dictionary definitions, newspaper
and magazine examples, and corpus linguistic data—cannot conclusively
show how the public perceives a mark. This is so because linguistic data
reflects usage.”92
Because of the opportunity to clarify and ask follow-up questions,
consumer surveys, while considerably more expensive to conduct than
corpus analysis, can provide a more nuanced window into consumer
understanding. Two types of surveys have traditionally been deployed in
genericism cases. The first has come to be known as a Thermos survey,
after the term at issue in the case in which it was first approved. 93 In a
Thermos survey, qualified respondents are asked a series of questions that
begins with describing a class of goods to the respondent, then asking the
respondent, for example, what word or words they would use in order to
obtain the item in a store, what other words they might use for such an
item, and whether the respondent can identify the names of any
manufacturers who make such an item.94 Thus, for example, a Thermos
survey testing the trademark BUBBLE WRAP might begin by asking
respondents whether they are familiar with a product that is used to wrap
fragile items for shipping and consists of a sheet of plastic with pockets
of sealed air. If the respondent indicates such a familiarity, they might
then be asked what word or words they would use to obtain this item in a
store, whether they can think of any other words for such an item, and
whether they can identify the names of any manufacturers of such an
item.95 In this example, if consumers have difficulty identifying the
product as anything other than “bubble wrap,” that might give the Sealed
Air Corporation pause as to the continuing strength of its trademark.96
buyers for whom the disputed name has a dual meaning, and (3) which meaning of dual functioning
names is more commonly used”); Thomas E. Murray, From Trade Name to Generic: The Case of
Coke, 43 NAMES 165 (1995); Butters & Westerhaus, supra note 61, at 121 (“Lexicographical
practice ought to be based on the fact that, while people do use trademarks as verbal shorthand,
they are generally aware that they are, in reality, speaking synecdochically: that a Band-Aid® is a
special kind of plastic bandage, that Jello® is a special kind of gelatin dessert, and that a reference
to a ‘Disney’ Beanie® is just a convenient synecdoche and not compelling evidence of genericide.”);
Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313 (2010);
Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 92 (2014)
(“Trademark hybridity . . . recognizes that a term need not be understood for either its generic or
its source identifying function. According to hybridity, both functions can, and do, coexist—
depending on the context in which the term is used.”).
92 Neal A. Hoopes, Reclaiming the Primary Significance Test: Dictionaries, Corpus Linguistics,
and Trademark Genericide, 54 TULSA L. REV. 407, 431 (2019).
93 Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962), aff’d sub nom.
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
94 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 12:15.
95 The interpretation of responses to this last question should not run afoul of trademark law’s
anonymous source doctrine, which does not require consumers to know the corporate name of the
company that makes a product so long as they recognize the trademarks that the company uses for
the product. See 1 id. § 3:12.
96 See BUBBLE WRAP, Registration No. 1,247,076 (issued Aug. 2, 1983, for “cellular cushioning
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The second kind of genericism survey is known as a Teflon survey,
after the term at issue in the case in which it was first approved. 97 In a
Teflon survey, the respondent is first given a minicourse in the difference
between a brand name and a common name, typically by being given
examples of each that are presumed to be obvious (such as “Chevrolet”
as an example of a brand name and “car” as an example of a common
name). The respondent is then tested with at least one additional example
(e.g., “Is ‘Pepsi’ a common name or a brand name? Is ‘cola’ a common
name or a brand name?”). Respondents who answer correctly are then
presented with a list to sort into one of the two categories, with the
trademark at issue included among the list.98 The idea is that by
comparing the results for the trademark at issue with the results for other
words in the list, one can determine whether the mark at issue is
understood by consumers as a source indicator or as a generic term.
Although a Teflon survey is now generally considered to be the
preferred method,99 both types of surveys have their positives and
negatives.100 A Thermos survey, unlike a Teflon survey, is rooted in the
consumer experience, as it asks consumers to imagine themselves asking
for an item in a store. But it might, in some instances, be open to
misinterpretation. Consider, for example, the consumer who uses
“kleenex” in casual conversation to refer to any kind of facial tissue but
who also understands that KLEENEX is a trademark for one particular
facial tissue. Such a consumer might answer the question “If you were to
ask a store clerk for an item that you would use to blow your nose, what
word would you use?” with “kleenex” regardless of this understanding.
The follow-up question “Can you think of any other words you would
use to describe this item?” might elicit the term “facial tissue” or “tissue,”
but unless the respondent understands the question to be asking for other
terms that one might use for that item, the answer might not be as useful
as originally thought.101
A Teflon survey might be seen as comparatively easier to administer
and code, since answers require little in the way of interpretation. But a
Teflon survey can also prove problematic. First, the survey’s format must
packaging material which contains entrapped bubbles of air or other gases”).
97 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
98 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 12:16.
99 E. Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of Species, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1131 (2009) (“Since E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, Teflon Surveys have been
the preferred format for genericness surveys, as reflected by U.S. court opinions and U.S.
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decisions in which they have been approved.”).
100 See Ullrich, supra note 86, at 995–1001 (describing benefits and drawbacks of both kinds of
surveys).
101 There are, of course, concerns regarding this kind of survey more generally, such as the
possibility of interpreter or interviewer bias or coding issues.
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convey to consumers that words serve as trademarks not in the abstract
but in context. A truly correct answer to the question as to whether any
term is a brand name or a common name should be “I don’t know—it
depends on the good or service with which it is associated.” Thus, the
question “Is ‘diesel’ a brand name or a common name?,” if presented with
no additional explanatory material, should yield the answer “It depends,”
since “diesel” would be considered generic for a type of fuel used in
motor vehicles and would be an arbitrary mark for clothing.102
Additionally, the choice of terms used for the minicourse or the pretest
might influence consumers in their understanding of what it means to be
a trademark. In the example given above, the use of “Pepsi” to represent
a trademark might unintentionally convey that trademarks must be
fanciful or arbitrary terms.
This concern was present in the Teflon survey submitted by
Booking.com B.V. in Booking.com,103 where the terms in the minicourse
identified as trademarks were TOYOTA, CHASE, and STAPLES.COM,
while the terms identified as generic were AUTOMOBILE, BANK, and
OFFICESUPPLIES.COM.104 According to the survey expert,
STAPLES.COM and OFFICESUPPLIES.COM were included to
minimize the chance that respondents would think that any “.com” term
was a trademark:
This allows us to compare the perceptions of BOOKING.COM to
other DOT-COM terms that clearly do or do not function as brands in
order to assess whether consumer perception of BOOKING.COM as
a brand name meaningfully exceeds the rate at which respondents will
answer that a generic term with “.com” at the end is a brand.105

But it is not obvious why STAPLES.COM “clearly” functions as a brand
while OFFICESUPPLIES.COM does not, except to the extent that the
juxtaposition of STAPLES.COM and OFFICESUPPLIES.COM
indicated to consumers that the comparison they were intended to make
was between Staples, the brand name of an office supply chain, and
“office supplies.” While the company does hold a registration for
STAPLES.COM,106 it is likely that respondents did not see that term as a
See DIESEL, Registration No. 1,564,710 (registration for various types of apparel).
Expert Report of Hal Poret: Survey to Assess Whether BOOKING.COM Is Perceived to Be a
Trademark or a Generic Name, Joint App. at 35–134, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com
B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020) (No. 19-46).
104 Id. at 44–45. The terms in the survey, which was conducted online, were presented visually to
respondents and in all uppercase letters, which I have replicated here.
105 Id. at 43.
106 STAPLES.COM, Registration No. 2,397,238 (registration for “mail order catalog services via
a global computer network featuring office supplies” and other goods). When visited in September
2021, the URL https://www.staples.com did not feature “STAPLES.COM” as a name anywhere on
102
103
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whole as the name of the company; rather, they recognized it as the
website for the company Staples. And although no company currently
holds a federal trademark registration for OFFICESUPPLIES.COM, the
company Officesupplies.com, Inc., did succeed in registering it on the
Supplemental Register in 2001 for office equipment and related goods,
based on a conclusion by the examiner that the mark was merely
descriptive but capable of becoming distinctive (although the registration
was cancelled in 2008 for failure to file a Section 8 declaration of use).107
The survey confused things further when it moved on to the sorting
task. Respondents who correctly answered the post-minicourse test
(which asked them to characterize the terms “Kellogg” and “cereal”)
were then told:
You will now see a series of bolded terms, one at a time, that you may
or may not have seen or heard before. Under each term, you will also
see a description of products or services for that term. For each term
shown in bold, please answer whether you think the term is a brand
name or a common name in the context of the products or services
described. Or if you don’t know, you may select that option.108

Some of the language in these instructions might have cued respondents
to think of the survey as a test of their ability to guess correctly. Although
the instructions tell respondents that they “may or may not have seen or
heard” the terms they will be shown, they are then told to indicate
“whether you think the term is a brand name or a common name in the
context of the products or services described.” Respondents were told that
“if you don’t know, you may select that option,” but asking “whether you
think the term is a brand name or a common name,” rather than something
like “whether, in your experience, you understand the term to be a brand
name or a common name” ran the risk of divorcing the responses from
the consumer experience.
The list of terms that respondents were asked to identify as either a
brand name or a common name (or to answer that they didn’t know) were
accompanied by product descriptions. In addition to BOOKING.COM,
the list included three brand names and descriptions and three “generic
(i.e., common name) terms.”109 The three brand names and their
descriptions were ETRADE.COM (described as “Stock and investor
broker services”); PEPSI (described as “Cola and other soft drinks”); and
SHUTTERFLY (described as “Photo-sharing and photo gifts service”).
the home page; the page title in the browser tab was “Staples® Official Online Store.”
107 OFFICESUPPLIES.COM, Registration No. 2,478,700 (issued on the Supplemental Register on
Aug. 14, 2001; cancelled on May 16, 2008).
108 Expert Report of Hal Poret, supra note 103, at 46 (emphases in original).
109 Id. at 47.
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The three generic terms were SPORTING GOODS (described as
“Products used in sports and other physical activity”);
WASHINGMACHINE.COM (described as “Reviews and sales of
washing machines”); and SUPERMARKET (described as “Retail sale of
food and other groceries”).110 The fact that 74.8% of respondents
identified BOOKING.COM as a brand name while only 33% of
respondents identified WASHINGMACHINE.COM as a brand name led
the expert to conclude that a meaningful percentage of consumers
understood BOOKING.COM to be a brand name for reasons other than
its lexical formation.111
The description for WASHINGMACHINE.COM, however, was
inaccurate. Unlike “supermarket,” the term “washingmachine.com” is
not a term used by consumers in any way except as part of a URL; as a
URL, www.washingmachine.com immediately redirects (as of this
writing) to the site of the online home goods store Wayfair at
www.wayfair.com. The company does sell washing machines, but its site
could not reasonably be described, as the survey implies, as a site that
only provides reviews and sales of washing machines.112 And even
though this survey’s respondents were told they could answer that they
didn’t know how to characterize a term, only 6.3% of respondents
answered “don’t know,”113 despite likely never having encountered or
used the term WASHINGMACHINE.COM.114
This example suggests that a Teflon survey might not capture
consumer understanding in the marketplace; rather, it might capture only
whether respondents are good students. Respondents might correctly sort
the given list into either the trademark category or the common name
category based on what they have been told about the mark (by the
company’s educational advertising campaign, for example), or based on
their hunches about what is likely to look like a generic term, but that
does not necessarily correspond to how the consumer understands the

Id.
Id. at 66–67.
Wayfair registered the domain in November 1999. See ICANN Lookup, https://lookup.icann.org
/lookup (search for WASHINGMACHINE.COM). A search of the Internet Archive’s Wayback
Machine indicates that the URL has redirected to Wayfair’s site since as early as September 2017.
See Wayback Machine, https://archive.org (search for WASHINGMACHINE.COM).
113 Expert Report of Hal Poret, supra note 103, at 66. Of the seven terms tested, the percentage
responding “don’t know” was highest for WASHINGMACHINE.COM at 6.3%. Zero respondents
answered “don’t know” with respect to SUPERMARKET and SPORTING GOODS; 0.3% of
respondents answered “don’t know” with respect to each of ETRADE.COM and
SHUTTERFLY.COM; and 1.5% of respondents answered “don’t know” with respect to
BOOKING.COM. Id. at 65–66.
114 Cf. Greenbaum et al., supra note 8, at 119 n.49 (suggesting that Teflon surveys should include
an “I never heard of it” response to capture respondents who “have no basis for a choice, as opposed
to persons who have encountered the term, but simply are not sure of its meaning”).
110
111
112
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term in the context of a purchasing experience.115 If the goal is to obtain
that kind of assessment, it may be that the Thermos survey’s format, if
not its list of questions, is the better method. To rethink that list, I turn to
Grice’s theory of conversational implicature.
IV. TRADEMARKS AS CONVERSATION
H.P. Grice famously introduced the idea of conversational
implicature to explain how we engage in effective communication despite
utterances that, on their face, appear to be nonresponsive. Grice first
introduced the Cooperative Principle—the idea that participants to a
conversation act rationally and toward a mutual goal of effective
conversation. He defined the Cooperative Principle thus: “Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged.”116 In order to conform with the Cooperative Principle,
participants in a conversation will generally follow several categories of
maxims that will, per Grice, “in general, yield results in accordance with
the Cooperative Principle,” the categories being Quantity, Quality,
Relation, and Manner.117
When an utterance appears to violate one of the maxims, a hearer
will typically interpret it so that the utterance does conform with the
Cooperative Principle. That conformity may rely on what Grice called
implicature—the unstated communication that makes what seems like a
nonconforming statement cooperative. Thus, a speaker who says p but
implicates q will communicate q so long as the speaker is observing these
conversational maxims and the hearer understands (and the speaker
expects the hearer to understand) that q is what makes saying p consistent
with the Cooperative Principle.118
This might be the result of an overbroad survey universe. Many consumers who “know” that
VELCRO, for example, is a trademark might never use the term that way in a purchasing experience
because they are purchasers of products with hook-and-loop fasteners, not purchasers of fasteners
separately.
116 H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41, 45 (Peter
Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
117 The category of Quantity contains two maxims (“1. Make your contribution as informative as
is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more
informative than is required.”). Id. at 45. The category of Quality comprises a “supermaxim” (“Try
to make your contribution one that is true.”) and two more specific maxims (“1. Do not say what
you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”). Id. at 46. The
category of Relation contains a single maxim (“Be relevant.”). Id. And the category of Manner
includes the supermaxim “Be perspicuous” and “various maxims” such as “1. Avoid obscurity of
expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4. Be orderly.” Id.
118 Id. at 49–50; see also Kent Bach, The Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature, in DRAWING
THE BOUNDARIES OF MEANING 21, 24 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006) (“As listeners,
we presume that the speaker is being cooperative (at least insofar as he is trying to make his
communicative intention evident) and is speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, and
otherwise appropriately. If an utterance superficially appears not to conform to any of these
115
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Of these, the category of Quantity is most relevant for our discussion
here and comprises two maxims: “1. Make your contribution as
informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”119
Grice gives as an example a professor who is recommending a student
for a position in philosophy and writes in the reference letter solely, “Mr.
X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has
been regular.”120 On its face, this communication would appear to violate
the maxim of Quantity, since in a reference letter, one would expect the
writer to say something about the individual’s qualifications for the job
at hand. Because this letter has not done this, the reader of the letter, who
assumes that the writer intends a cooperative communication, will
understand the writer’s implicature: that they cannot say anything
positive about the individual’s relevant qualifications for the position.
The writer, moreover, expects the hearer to make this assumption; hence,
the writer does not have to include this statement in the letter.
Context can also be relevant to the concept of implicature. For
example, person X might say to person Y, “Why does this soup taste so
terrible?,” and person Y might respond, “Smith made it.” On its face,
“Smith made it” is not a response to “Why does this soup taste so
terrible?”; a direct response would be “Because it has too much salt” or
“Because the cream in it was spoiled.” In context, however, the response
“Smith made it” is a responsive communication, assuming that both
parties know Smith and know that Smith has a reputation for not being a
good cook.
As Jennifer Saul writes, the notion of cooperation is key to this
analysis.121 A speaker might intend for the hearer to understand that an
implicature is required, but if the hearer fails to similarly understand, or
if the speaker and the hearer lack a shared context, the communication
will fail. To give an example, imagine that person A asks person B if they
would like some soup, and person B says, “I’m a vegan.” Person B’s
statement is not directly responsive to the offer of soup (as the answer
“No, thank you” would be), but it might be said to implicate that B cannot
eat the soup because its ingredients are not consistent with a vegan diet.
But, as Saul suggests (giving a different example), for that statement to
be conversationally implicated, person A must understand what it means

presumptions, the listener looks for a way of taking it so that it does conform. He does so partly on
the supposition that he is intended to. As speakers, in trying to choose words to make our
communicative intentions evident, we exploit the fact that our listeners presume these things.”).
119 Grice, supra note 116, at 45.
120 Id. at 52.
121 Jennifer M. Saul, Speaker Meaning, What Is Said, and What Is Implicated, 36 NOÛS 228 (2002).
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to be a vegan (and, presumably, be familiar with the ingredients in the
soup). This is true even though person A understands that person B is
giving a reason for refusing the soup (and thus does not doubt person B’s
compliance with the Cooperative Principle) and so might need to ask,
“What is there in the soup that you cannot eat?” in order for the
communication to be successful.122
These principles can inform the consideration of generics as a
linguistic matter. Take, for example, the sentence “The dog is a very
food-motivated animal.” How does the listener know whether “the dog”
refers to dogs as a class or to a particular dog? The text of the sentence
itself is not likely to resolve this question—on its face, “the dog” can bear
either meaning. Thus, the listener uses the context of the utterance to
determine which sense is meant. If the sentence “The dog is a very foodmotivated animal” is uttered at the beginning of a science documentary
discussing the nature and characteristics of dogs, the hearer is likely to
interpret the term “the dog” as a generic. If, on the other hand, the
sentence is uttered as part of a conversation involving how to care for the
speaker’s two pets (“Here’s what you need to know. The dog is a very
food-motivated animal. The cat will never respond to a treat.”), the hearer
will understand the phrase “the dog” to refer to a specific animal.
As Renaat Declerck has suggested, an understanding of which is
meant “depends in part on the semantics of the sentence and partly on
pragmatic reasoning (which merges the semantics with information that
is available from the context and from the language user’s general
knowledge of the world).”123 Declerck thus draws from Grice’s maxim
of Quantity a principle that he refers to as the maximal-set principle,
which stipulates that “when the speaker uses a description referring to a
set, the hearer has a right to assume that the intended set is the largest
possible set of entities satisfying the description and the NP [noun
phrase]–inherent and contextual restrictions.”124 As an example, he
contrasts the utterances “I like roses” and “I grow roses”:
In the case of I like roses the reference of the noun phrase roses is
restricted neither by the form of the NP itself, nor by the context, nor
by pragmatic factors. The hearer will therefore conclude that the
reference is here to the largest set of entities satisfying the description
Id. at 234. Saul terms this “utterer-implicature.” Id. at 235; see also id. at 241 (“Speakers have
authority over what they utterer-implicate, but they can’t fully control what they conversationally
implicate.”). Saul contrasts this with “audience-implicature,” in which “audiences have authority
over what is audience-implicated.” Id. at 242. Thus, “[a] claim which is both utterer-implicated and
audience implicated, then, will be one which is successfully communicated: the speaker tried to
implicate it, and the audience took it to be implicated.” Id. at 243.
123 Renaat Declerck, The Origins of Genericity, 29 LINGUISTICS 79, 80 (1991).
124 Id. at 83.
122

6. Heymann ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

984

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

4/9/2022 11:09 AM

[Vol. 39:3

roses, that is, the generic set of roses. On the other hand, in I grow
roses it is clear that there are contextual restrictions on the referent set:
the spatio-temporal restrictions inherent in I grow make it impossible
for the referent set to be the generic set of roses. In this case the scope
of the maximal-set principle is limited by our pragmatic knowledge of
the world.125

We can draw from this literature to inform our understanding about
how individuals communicate about trademarks in a particular context.
When the individual on the sofa says to a companion, “Can you get me
some [K]leenex?” the other individual understands:
I can’t hand them a couple of Kleenex brand tissues, since there aren’t
any at hand. Presumably, they don’t expect me to leave here and go in
search of a Kleenex brand tissue. So, in order to make this utterance
cooperative, I need to assume that the person is using “Kleenex” not
to refer to a brand of tissues, but to refer to the tissues next to me on
the table.

And because the speaker expects the hearer to understand this, the
speaker does not need to add, “By the way, I mean a tissue from the box
on the table, regardless of who makes it.” As with the previous examples,
context will aid interpretation; if the individual who asks, “Can you get
me some [K]leenex?” has just sneezed, that will assist with interpreting
the sentence.126
Contrast this with the speaker of the same sentence, “Can you get
me some [K]leenex?” but now said to an individual heading off to the
store. This is a possible example of Jennifer Saul’s “uttererimplicature”127 in that the speaker might intend for the hearer to purchase
any brand of facial tissue, or, conversely, might intend for the speaker to
purchase only Kleenex brand tissue. This will be a successful
conversational implicature if the hearer and the speaker have a shared
understanding such that the hearer will know which of the two requests
is meant. In order to know which has resulted, we must either know what
further conversation has taken place (for example, if the hearer asks,
“Which brand of kleenex did you want?”) or observe the result of this
conversation (the hearer returns with a box of facial tissues, at which

Id.; see also Grice, supra note 116, at 44 (giving the example of the sentence “He is in the grip
of a vice” and noting that context allows the hearer to determine whether the meaning is
metaphorical (the individual is trapped in a difficult situation) or literal (the individual is caught in
a tool).
126 Sperber & Wilson, supra note 63, at 92 (“[In the sentence ‘Here’s a Kleenex,’] the implication
It can be used to blow one’s nose is activated in the hearer’s mind not only by the word ‘Kleenex’
but also by the fact that he has just been sneezing.”).
127 See discussion supra note 122.
125
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point it is determined whether the hearer has satisfied the speaker’s
request).
Another example: In parts of the southern United States, the
utterance at a restaurant “I’d like a coke, please” satisfies the Cooperative
Principle because the server understands, and the speaker expects the
server to understand, that the word “coke” is being used to denote any
kind of soft drink.128 So when the server replies, “What kind of coke
would you like?,” that is not a question aimed at determining whether
“coke” is being used to refer to any soft drink or a brand name; it is being
used to elicit a brand name, much as would the question “What brand of
beer would you like?” Thus, the speaker would typically respond with
something like “a Sprite,” “a Dr. Pepper,” or even “a Coke.” As above,
observing only one part of the conversation does not give us a full sense
of how the term at issue is being understood.
Thinking of marks as elements of a conversation, and adjusting
surveys accordingly, reinforces the twofold rationale behind not
according trademark protection to generic terms: (1) consumers do not
understand generic terms as source-indicating, and so such terms do not
satisfy the definition of what it means to be a trademark, and (2) relatedly,
consumers understand generic terms to be the common name of the good
or service itself, and so producers cannot compete effectively unless they
can use those terms to communicate to consumers that they are providing
the same type of good or service as their competitors. Under this
framework, it matters less what words individuals say and mean for such
goods or services and more what words they hear and understand. In
short, genericism analyses should minimize simply asking respondents to
report about their understanding in favor of formats that allow
observation of that understanding.129
How, then, might we incorporate the concept of trademarks as
conversation into determinations of whether a given term is generic? In
the limited space of a symposium contribution, I do not intend here to
provide a comprehensive consideration of such evidence, or even of
surveys in particular. But, for existing evidence, such as corpora and
social media, we should ensure that we are reading terms in context—not
only what a speaker says but how other participants to the conversation
react. Where possible, researchers should observe not only how a mark is
used online but also how such uses are responded to, such as in discussion
Murray, supra note 91, at 167.
Cf. NATALIE SCHILLING, SOCIOLINGUISTIC FIELDWORK 77 (2013) (noting that “people’s
reports of their linguistic usage may or may not match up with what they do in non-research
contexts”); Ullrich, supra note 86, at 1006 (“[P]eople are not very good at observing their own
speech, let alone explaining it to surveyors.”) (citing SCHILLING).
128
129
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threads or comment sections, to confirm consumer understanding.
Consumer surveys might involve not asking consumers about their views
of terms but asking them to engage in a variety of online search tasks,
taking into account the ways in which search results and other groupings
of items have an effect on what consumers perceive as the relevant
“shelf.”
We might also consider a variation on the Thermos survey that
focuses less on the words the respondent would use and more on how the
respondent would interpret a given utterance using the term. For example,
taking “Kleenex” as our example, a survey might display a number of
unbranded facial tissue boxes or packages and ask the respondent (orally,
via a recording, or in unmarked text), “If I were to ask you to go to the
store and buy some [K]leenex, which of these, if any, would satisfy that
request?” The respondent would then be asked to select one or more of
the images, to check a box that says, “none of these,” or to check a box
that says, “I need more information.” The respondent would then have
the opportunity to explain their decision. An alternative question would
display a variety of unbranded tissue boxes or packages; the respondent
would then be asked:
Imagine you were in a supermarket, and you were looking for the shelf
with these products. Supermarkets typically have signs hanging above
each aisle indicating the types of products that are in that aisle.
Imagine that the aisle contained only these products. What word or
words would you expect to see on the sign for the aisle where these
products are located?130

Still another possibility might be to ask the respondent about alternative
common names for the product at issue, rather than about the disputed
trademark—such as, “If I were to ask you to go to the store and buy some
facial tissue, which of these would satisfy that request?”—in order to
determine the viability and understanding of claimed generic terms.
Ultimately, any choice as to method and evidentiary sources
involves a tradeoff between cost and administrability and the robustness
of the result. The suggested survey formats above require interpretation
Cf. Palladino, supra note 82, at 886 (suggesting, in a Teflon survey, after the minicourse is given
and the product shown, “If this type of product were made by more than one company, what do
you believe those companies would call the product [in offering to sell it to you]?,” although this
phrasing might suggest that the interviewer is seeking examples of brand names, given the framing
the minicourse provided) (alteration in original). See also, e.g., Brendan Palfreyman Esq.
(@B_Palfreyman), TWITTER (May 7, 2021, 8:53 PM), https://twitter.com/B_Palfreyman/status
/1390832224992329732 (posting photograph of store shelves with various brands of shampoo with
the shelf header “Head & Shoulders”); Trademarks Are Magic (@TimberlakeLaw), TWITTER (May
7, 2021, 10:14 PM), https://twitter.com/TimberlakeLaw/status/1390852460915433476 (posting
photograph of supermarket aisle header reading “Popsicles”); cf. HEAD & SHOULDERS,
Registration No. 729,556; POPSICLE, Registration No. 2,421,400.
130
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of the results, and so one might well conclude that the preference for
Teflon surveys in genericism cases is a reasonable one, despite that
format’s “total up the points” approach.131 And while advances in online
surveys might make a version of Thermos-type engagement more
appealing, risk-averse litigants may be understandably reluctant to adopt
new formats that may not find favor in court.
CONCLUSION
There are reasons to critique the Court’s opinion in Booking.com.
But the opinion’s core conclusion—that the trademark status of a word
fundamentally depends on consumer understanding—is correct. Indeed,
it is difficult to understand how else we might determine the meaning of
a word, even if we sometimes assume consumer understanding rather
than assess it. Gaining complete clarity on how consumers understand
trademarks is likely to remain an impossible task. But by viewing
trademarks as part of conversational exchanges—where we recognize
that what is not said might be as important to understanding as what is
said—we might, after seventy-five years of the Lanham Act, get a bit
closer to the question we’re trying to answer.

Cf. Barton Beebe, Roy Germano, Christopher Jon Sprigman & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of
Consumer Uncertainty in Trademark Law: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation 5 (May
28, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3854730 (criticizing the leading trademark survey formats for “inquir[ing] into consumer beliefs
without providing any way for respondents to indicate the strength with which they hold a particular
belief”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 15–25 (testing alternatives to the Teflon survey format).
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